The Russian threat puts French networks under strain

Limited cable audit

Well equipped and equipped, Gugi’s fleet includes the Yantar spy ship (a clone is under construction) equipped with a mini-submarine capable of submerging to a depth of 6,000 meters. In August 2021, this supposedly “oceanographic” building was discovered in Ireland near the transatlantic submarine cables through which about 95% of the world’s internet and telephone exchanges pass.

Read alsoRisk of Internet shutdown by Russia: submarine cables seek shield

The attack on the Nord Stream gas pipelines has raised fears of a “hybrid war” orchestrated by the Kremlin. In the process, President Macron asked the Navy and the General Secretariat of Defense and National Security (SGDSN) to inspect 23 submarine cables linked to France. “Thanks to Orange operator and manufacturer Alcatel Submarine Networks, we have significant repair facilities, the insider says. On the other hand, we cannot see mines or other elements placed on our cables, especially more. important, transatlantic, at a depth of 6,000 meters.”

NATO’s capabilities have decreased

A key vulnerability that prompted the Navy to announce in February that it would acquire an autonomous underwater robot (AUV) and a remotely operated underwater vehicle (ROV) to reach those depths. “We are clearly vulnerable to Russia,” says Bernard Barbier, former technical director of the Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE). Sönke Marahrens, a researcher at the European Center of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats, shared his opinion: “NATO made a mistake by reducing its capabilities in this area, while Russia strengthened them.”

On October 20, an underwater cable rupture in the Shetland Islands, north of Scotland (we don’t know if it was criminal or accidental), temporarily cut off the archipelago’s 23,000 inhabitants, but experts believe it was a provocation. If there were only too many in France, it would be devastating. “80% of our traffic goes to the United States, so it would be good if the transatlantic megacable was cut, two would be problematic and three would be very hot,” said Jean-Luc Vuillemin, Orange’s director of international networks. .

The relatively frequent (400 per year on average) submarine cable cuts, such as those associated with fishing, are mostly accidental. As was the case near Aix-en-Provence on October 18, overhead cables are more accessible to malicious actors, resulting in thousands of users slowing down the internet. “Can a cable be 100% safe?” asks the industry expert, whether it’s on land or underwater, concrete or steel sheathed, it’s impossible over thousands of kilometers of track. carry out repairs”.

Growing threats to strategic installations

Beyond communications infrastructure, the second major concern is cyber security, another front in potential hybrid warfare, and Russia’s reputation for being an aggressor. Since February 24, several digital raids have targeted Ukraine, Poland and the United States. So, on October 10, the websites of American Chicago, Los Angeles, and Atlanta airports were blocked by pro-Russian hackers for a short time.

In France, the authorities do not report anything remarkable. In recent months, cyberattacks against hospitals and multinational companies are mostly the work of cybercriminal groups using ransomware. But Jacques de La Riviere, co-founder of Gatewatcher, the company that developed the first computer probe to detect cyberattacks aimed at operators of vital importance (OIV), strategic French companies and administrations, insists it has “engines for an implant”. detection [portes dérobées dans le code d’un logiciel par où passent les pirates pour espionner ou saboter] They call more often these days.”

“Since September, warnings have multiplied, one OIV’s security manager has a lot. We have been subjected to many classic attacks by DDoS. [afflux de requêtes destiné à saturer un serveur pour le rendre inopérant]. For now, it’s a tick on the shell.” Now that it becomes difficult to directly attack large well-secured companies, attackers go through subcontractors. Thus, in 2019, Airbus was targeted by an attack by APT 10. A Chinese state-linked group accessed the aircraft manufacturer through one of its suppliers. had been

Pearl Harbor Cyber ​​Risk

Today, these attacks, manipulated by states, are above all industrial espionage. Nevertheless, the National Information Systems Security Agency (ANSI) regularly warns of a possible dark scenario: causing a “cyber-Pearl Harbor” by placing “explosive charges” on a network computer that could be set in motion the day a power decides to take action.

Guillaume Poupard, CEO of Anssi, has always been silent on possible clues to support this fear. Heard by the Senate on October 5, he noted that in 2021 alone, France was affected by 17 major operations, 14 of which were espionage, and among them “9 correspond to operational methods of Chinese origin”.

However, the agency’s capacity is limited. “With 600 employees, Annecy is doing a very good job, believe the former member of the house. Apart from this context, it takes 1,000 people to do everything well.”

Planned factory sabotage

For his part, Jacques de La Rivière is positive: “In terms of protecting critical infrastructure, we are more advanced than the United States”, France only has a cyber security agency (Cisa) since 2018 compared to 2009. But danger is potentially everywhere…and not where you expect it.

So while Russia’s strikes around the Ukrainian power plant in Zaporizhia have raised concerns about a nuclear accident, French authorities are providing ultra-security of tricolor reactors to buildings (sometimes via automated drones) or computer systems. On the other hand, according to our information, the Minister of the Armed Forces, Sébastien Lecornu, invited officials from the aeronautics sector in early November to discuss the risks of sabotage of their assembly lines by drones or electromagnetic disturbances. “Given the geopolitical moment we’re in, special vigilance is needed,” we recognize at Matignon.